Fighting spirit and the right Western arms may stymie a powerful foe
精神及最宜的西方武器，可能使大的人受到挫折。
Apr 23rd 2022
TAIPEI, TOKYO AND WASHINGTON, DC
On a friday night in Taipei, dozens of people gather in a bookstore to learn what to do if war comes to Taiwan. The shop window is plastered with slogans denouncing China and supporting freedom in Tibet, Xinjiang and Hong Kong.
在台北，一星期五晚上，十人聚集在一家，窗上了，多中及支持西藏、新疆香港自由之的店，悉倘若台生，怎。。
Nearby is a new protest wall: a Ukrainian flag speckled with Post-it notes in English, Mandarin and Taiwanese. “Stand with Ukraine”, says one. “Fuck Putin”, exclaims another. A third declares: “China, Russia: langbeiweijian” . ie, a wolf and a bei (a mythical beast) colluding to do evil.
附近有一堵新的抗：一面著英、普通(中)及台便利的克旗。有人：「克站在一起。」另一人喊叫：「操普丁。」第三人宣：「中，俄斯：狼奸。」即，狼(神中的野)勾作。
This refers to a traditional story of two deformed creatures—a wolf with long front legs and short hind ones, and a bei with the opposite impairment—collaborating to devour sheep.
指的是，具有前腿、短後腿的狼具有相反疾的，陋生物行勾，狼吞虎羊的一故事。
With China and Russia declaring their friendship has “no limits”, Taiwanese fear they will be the next prey. How to survive? In the bookshop, a former naval signaller and a Krav Maga martial-arts instructor lead discussions on disaster planning, self-defence, mutual aid, treating wounds and more.
著中俄斯宣布他的友“限”，台人心他成下一物。在店，一位前海信及一位以色列近身格(Krav Maga)的武教，、自、互助、治口等，行多。
Such workshops have become especially popular since the invasion of Ukraine, notes T.H. Schee, the signaller. “A year ago, most people thought we would never see war in our generation,” he explains. “Ukraine made everyone realise: war is here.” The session is a rare chance to overcome defeatism, he thinks. “We focus on protecting yourself, your family and your community first. We empower them to do something.”
名信，T.H. Schee特提及，打俄斯入侵克以，此已得特普遍。他解：「一年前，大多人，我一代不看到。不，克使得每人意到：就在。」他，是克服失主的得。「首先，我著重於保自己、家人及社。要使他能做事。」
Invasion from the mainland has been a worry ever since China’s nationalist rulers lost a civil war against the communists and fled to Taiwan in 1949. For a long time the two entities both claimed to be the legitimate government of China.
打中民治者，在共的中，失於149年逃往台以，自大的侵犯，一直是件令人的事。期以，都是中的合法政府。
A distinct Taiwanese identity has gradually formed, but Taiwan, which still calls itself the Republic of China (ROC), dares not declare itself independent for fear of provoking the mainland. That leaves it in limbo: a vibrant democracy and the world’s biggest purveyor of advanced semiconductors, which has diplomatic relations with just 14 countries.
明的台身份(主性)已逐形成。不，仍然自中民(ROC)的台，不敢自行宣布立，生怕惹大。那使其於不定：也就是，一充活力，且是世界上最大先半供商，不14家有外交的民主家。
Over the decades, Taiwan has swung from the delusion of reconquering the mainland to a deepening hopelessness—a sense that it can do little on its own to defeat an invasion. As a share of GDP, defence spending fell from 5.2% in 1990 to 2.7% in 2000 and 1.9% in 2020 (it may rise to 2.1% this year). The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute reckons that, in dollar terms, China’s defence budget is 20 times larger than Taiwan’s.
十年，台已重新打大的幻想，向日益加深的望。是一，法靠自己犯的感。作生毛(GDP：Gross domestic product)的一部分，防支1990年的5.2%下降到2000年的2.7%，及 2020年的1.9%(今年(2022年)可能上升到2.1%)。瑞典斯德哥摩和平研究所(致力於研究突、、控制及裁的立)估，以美元算，中的防算比台多20倍。
legacy of nearly four decades of military dictatorship, which ended in 1987. The armed forces are shrinking as they give way to an all-volunteer force. What little remains of conscription—four months for men—is regarded as a waste of time and often shirked.
在台，防支一直不受迎。部分原因是，於1987年束之近四十年事裁治的(留下的影)。由於被完全由志者成的部所取代，武部正在萎中。剩下徵兵(男性服役四月)的少，被是一的浪，且常被法避。
The infantry’s strongest skills, Mr Schee quips, are “painting walls, picking grass and falsifying documents”. For a time, some Taiwanese thought trade with China might stay its hand, but the aggressive nationalism of Xi Jinping, China’s president, has dispelled that illusion. For the most part, Taiwan has sheltered behind the shield of American deterrence.
Schee先生，步兵最的技能是“粉刷壁、除草及造文件”。有段，一些台人，中的易可能停止。不，中家主席近平，咄咄逼人的民族主，已消除了那。大程度上，一直躲在美威力量的盾牌後面。
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is causing a profound rethinking. The stout resistance by Ukrainians gives some Taiwanese hope that they, too, might be able to hold off a powerful foe. Yet the war also brings two sobering thoughts. One is that neither the threat of sanctions nor the West’s arming of Ukraine deterred Russia. The other is that Russia’s nuclear threats have deterred America from intervening directly. China, too, has nuclear weapons.
俄斯的入侵克正在引一，自心深的反思。克人的抵抗，使一些台人生了，他可能也能抵住大人的希望。然而，此也了人省思的想法。一是，制裁威及西方克的武，皆有威住俄斯。另一是，俄斯的核威，已威住美直接干。而中也有核武器。
Contradictory emotions are apparent in a poll by the Taiwan Centre for International Strategic Studies, a think-tank. It showed a startling jump in the share of Taiwanese willing to fight to defend Taiwan, from 40% in December to 70% in March.
在一由台略研究中心(一智)行的民意查中，多矛盾情是清晰可的。在台人意保台而的比例上，它示了，2021年12月40%到2022年3月70%的人升。
A similar percentage supported extending the conscription period, a move currently under debate. But confidence that America would intervene has dropped markedly, from 55% to 43%. Scarcely a third of respondents thought Taiwan could hold off an invasion alone.
相似的百分比支持延徵兵期，是目前中的一措施。不，美介入的信心著下降，55%降至43%。乎不到三分之一的受者，台能抵住侵犯。
Many in Taiwan thus watch the war in Ukraine with a mix of hope and dread. Its full lessons will depend on the outcome. But an obvious one is the importance of time: to prepare defences and international assistance before a war; and, once one starts, to hold out long enough for help from friends to arrive.
因此，在台多人，以一混著希望及恐的心情，留神察於克的。其全部殷取於果。不，一而易的，是的重要性：在前防及援助；也就是，一旦打，在自友邦的助到之前，能持的抵抗。
But Ukraine is a largish country in the heart of Europe; Taiwan is a smallish island-state. Taiwan is thus blessed and cursed by what John Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago calls “the stopping power of water”. Taiwan is harder for a foe to invade, but also harder for its friends to resupply. Another difference is economic heft.
不，克是洲中心一大的家。台是一略小的。因此台遭到，美芝加哥大美政治家及者，John Mearsheimer“水制力”的祝福及咒。人侵犯台，不在其友邦到之前，也再。另一差是的重要性。
It will be tougher for the West to impose sanctions on China of the kind it has used to punish Russia. As the world’s second-largest economy (the largest if measured at purchasing-power parity), China is far more diversified and more integrated in global trade than Russia.
西方中施，其用俄斯的那制裁，是更。作世界第二大(倘若以力的比值，最大)，中比俄斯更多元化，且更融入全球易。
Even so, many in the West hope President Vladimir Putin’s military troubles in Ukraine will give Mr Xi pause. He will be even more conscious of the possibility of military failure—for him and for China’s Communist Party.
即便如此，多西方家希望弗拉基米·普丁，在克的事麻，使先生生豫。他及中共而言，他是更意到，事失的可能性。
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has not fought a war since its border conflict with Vietnam in 1979. Its leaders worry about “peacetime disease”. A Pentagon report notes that it is undergoing extensive reforms that could hamper its combat readiness until 2027 (but give it better options thereafter).
打1979年越南生界突以，中人民解放(PLA)未曾打一。其人心“和平期的弊病”。美五角大的一份告指出，它正在行可能阻其，直到2027年的多泛改革(不，此後予它更好的多)。
China’s generals will learn from Russia’s mistakes in Ukraine, as they do from any conflict with parallels to Taiwan (the Falklands war of 1982 is a favourite).
中的，俄斯在克的多中，吸取殷。因他具有似的任何突中，犯下(1982年的福克群，是一最受目的)。
“From a technical point of view, the Ukraine issue can indeed be seen as a rehearsal for a Taiwan Strait crisis,” Jin Canrong of Renmin University in Beijing told guancha.cn, a nationalist Chinese news site.“This is a very good learning opportunity. China can learn a lot from it, such as how to fight militarily, what pressure may be encountered politically, how to relieve that pressure, and so on.”
中北京人民大的Jin Canrong，告中民族主新站guancha.cn：「技，上克能被，台海危的一演。是一非常好的。中能中到很多西，譬如事上如何打仗，政治上可能遭遇什力，如何解此力，等等。」
Nothing Mr Xi learns from foreign examples is likely to alter his fundamental approach. He still favours reunification without fighting, but is prepared to use force, particularly if Taiwan makes a dash for independence. The signs are that China’s leader, who is 68, wants to achieve unification within his lifetime, ahead of his stated goal of “national rejuvenation” by 2049, the centenary of the communist victory.
先生外多例子到的任何西，一可能改其基本理的方式。他仍然偏好不的一，不用武力。特是，倘若台朝立急。象是，年68的中人，希望在其有生之年，完全一。也就是，他所宣，到2049年(共主利一百年)“民族”的目之前。
Events in Ukraine are unlikely to change his conviction that China has a window to achieve its goals while America is divided at home and struggling to restore credibility abroad after decades of failed interventions and erratic foreign policy.
於克的事件，不太可能改其信念。也就是，中具有多目的渠道，而美在分裂及在十年的干失不定的外交政策之後，正力恢外信。
And though some American alliances have been revitalised of late, Mr Xi may be heartened by the prospect of Russia preoccupying the Pentagon for years—just as wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria did for much of the past two decades.
Successive Chinese leaders have built the PLA into a formidable force, designed to conquer Taiwan while fighting off American reinforcements. Its navy now counts more ships than America’s.
然，最近有些美盟邦已被醒。不，先生或受到了，多年俄斯先五角大之可能性的鼓舞。正如在阿富汗、伊拉克、利比及利的中，於去二十年的大部分，所做的那。任的中人已人民解放打造成一支，旨在用武力攻取台，同退美增援部的大部。目前，其海共有比美更多艇。
It has developed a range of anti-aircraft and anti-ship missiles and sensors (known as anti-access/area-denial or a2/ad), intended to strike American and allied forces thousands of miles into the Pacific. The Pentagon says China’s conventional build-up is being matched by a nuclear one, with the aim of turning a minimal deterrent of a few hundred warheads into a stockpile of more than 1,000 warheads by 2030—closer to the size of America’s and Russia’s arsenals.
它已一系列防空及反感器(被通反介入/域拒止，也就是a2/ad)，旨在打千英里外，入太平洋的美及其盟。美五角大表示，中的常建置正核建置相匹配，其目是到2030年，百枚核的最低威力，成1千多枚核的。接近了，美及俄斯的核武模。
For now, the PLA will maintain its relentless testing and harassment of Taiwan, including frequent incursions into its air-defence identification zone (ADIZ). These are part of China’s “grey-zone” tactics which stop short of combat but practise for conflict and strain the island’s defences and its politics. Given China’s cyber-attacks and disinformation campaigns, many in Taiwan argue it is already under attack.
就目前而言，人民解放持其台，毫不懈的及，包括繁侵入其防空(ADIZ)。些是中，在生前突然停止，了突及使防政治，行演之“灰色地”的一部分。於中之路攻及假信息的宣活，台多人持已遭到攻。
Should it come to war, the main lesson that China will draw from Ukraine is the need for speed—ideally achieving victory within days—to ensure that Taiwan’s government cannot organise concerted resistance and America cannot intervene effectively.
如果生，中克吸取的主要殷，是速度的需求。最好是在天取得利，以保政府法同的抵抗，及美法有效干。
The PLA appears to have planned primarily for three types of assault: a missile barrage, an air and naval blockade, and a full-scale invasion. None guarantees a swift outcome. Bombardment will cause heavy damage but cannot easily force a surrender. A blockade would take even longer.
然中人民解放已了，主要用於三型的攻：猛烈，空海封，而後全面侵犯。人能保有迅速到果。炸造成重大失，不法易迫使投降。因，封需要更。
And the mustering of an amphibious invasion force is likely to be spotted well in advance of an attack, as Russia’s build-up was. It is anyway unclear that China has enough modern amphibious ships to move an invasion force quickly across the 180km Taiwan strait.
而且入侵部的集，很可能如同俄斯的集一，在攻之前就被。之，不清楚中是否有足的代艇，一支入侵部，快速移越180公里的台海。
Some combination of these three strategies may hold more promise. Jacob Stokes of the Centre for a New American Security, a think-tank in Washington, posits one possibility: China stages a large-scale naval exercise near Taiwan, then swiftly uses the ships to blockade the island.
三策略的某合可能更具有指望。於美首府盛特的一智，新美安全中心的Jacob Stokes，假了一可能性：中在台附近行大模海演，然後迅速使用艇封。
Like Mr Putin, Mr Xi threatens nuclear escalation against anyone who challenges the quarantine. As America debates how to respond, China uses the time to gather and launch its invasion force, and perhaps to decapitate the island’s government. “It’s one of the scariest scenarios,” says Mr Stokes. “It raises the cost of intervention from the outset.”
普丁一，先生威任何挑此封的家，行核升。在美如何之，中利用此集入侵部，或能瓦解政府。Stokes先生宣：「是最可怕的本之一。因，始就增加了干成本。」
Taiwan has for years talked about adopting its own a2/ad tactics as part of an “asymmetric” strategy, in which the weaker side uses defensive weapons, concealment and subterfuge to frustrate its foe.
多年，台一直在，用自己的 a2/ad作“不”略的一部分。在略中，弱的一方使用防性武器、匿及，挫其人。
America has been encouraging Taiwan to develop a “porcupine” doctrine. The concept has gone by names such as “Hard roc” and the “Overall Defence Concept”. The latter was championed by a former Taiwanese military chief, Lee Hsi-Ming.
美一直鼓台展一“豪”策略。此概念已被，如“硬石”及“整防概念”。 後者受到了，前台事首李喜明的支持。
It called for Taiwan to buy “a low quantity of high-quality platforms”, eg, jet fighters, ships and submarines, to fend off China’s grey-zone attacks. And it emphasised acquiring “a large number of small things”, especially anti-ship missiles, to ward off an invasion—preferably at sea, possibly on the beaches and if necessary in the mountains of Taiwan.
美呼台“少量、高量的平台”。譬如，射式、艇及艇，抵中之灰色地的攻。不，它取“大量小西”，特是反，抵入侵。最好是在海上，可能在海上，必要在台山。
Mr Lee points to the Javelin anti-tank missile used by Ukrainian soldiers. “If Ukraine had only tanks, could they fight Russia? Think of 1,000 Ukrainian tanks versus 10,000 Russian tanks. Then think of 10,000 Russian tanks versus 100,000 Ukrainian Javelins. That is asymmetric warfare.”
李先生指著克士兵使用的反坦克，宣：「倘若克只有坦克，他能抗俄斯？想想1千克坦克及1俄斯坦克。然後，想想1俄斯坦克及10枚克。那才是不。」
Taiwan still espouses an asymmetric strategy, but Mr Lee’s vision appears to have been watered down through a combination of individual services’ love of expensive kit and genuine doubts. Taiwan is buying and developing mines and anti-ship, anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, but far too few, argues Mr Lee.
台仍然取不略。不，透合了人服部，於昂的及多真正的疑。然，李先生的看法已被淡化。李先生，台正在及地雷及反艇、反坦克防空武器。不，太少了。
He and American critics question the billions being spent on expensive systems—be they indigenous attack submarines or American m1 Abrams tanks, Apache and Black Hawk helicopters and F-16v jets. “They are buying stuff for things that won’t give them much security,” argues Evan Medeiros of Georgetown University.
他及多美批者疑，十美元被花在昂系上。也就是，本土的攻性艇，或美M1艾布拉姆斯坦克、阿帕契黑直升及F-16v 射式。美治城大的Evan Medeiros：「他正在，不予他太多安全感的物。」
In a war, he suggests, many of the high-end weapons will be quickly destroyed or rendered ineffective; the American navy might tell Taiwan not to deploy its submarines lest they be mistaken for Chinese ones.
他暗示，在一中，多高端武器很快被摧或失效。美海可能告台，不要部署其艇，以免被中艇。
Shu Hsiao-huang of the Institute for National Defence and Security Research, a think-tank funded by the defence ministry, demurs: “We have the Taiwan Strait. So our first battle is going to be there. We need equipment to control the air and sea.” He also argues that, right now, “the threat of war is 10% but the peacetime threat of grey-zone activity is 90%.”
由防部助之智，防暨安全研究所的舒煌，提出：「我有台海。因此，我的第一，是在那。我需要控制空中及海上的。”他也，目前，「威10%。不，和平期之灰色地的活威是90%。」
And even in a war, he says, Taiwan must be ready to keep air corridors and sea lanes open because it has no guarantee that America will. Phil Davidson, the former commander of American forces in the Indo-Pacific, argues that Taiwan needs offensive weapons.
他表示，即使在中，也必好，保持空中走廊及海上航道的通。因，有保美能做到。前印太地的美司令， Phil Davidson，需要攻性武器。
“There’s too much discussion of an amphibious assault. China has a lot of other ways to pound Taiwan into submission, including missiles and cyber-attacks. If the Chinese don’t know their forces or points of departure are at risk, you cannot deter them. You can’t win at soccer only in defence. You have to be able to score a goal.”
「有太多攸攻的。中有包括及路攻等，很多其他方法，台屈服。倘若中人不知道，他的部或出於危之中，就法阻止他。不能在防守上得足球，必能球。」
It is of course easier to play catenaccio , the rigid Italian “strong chain” defence, if your teammates can hit the back of the net. The Baltic states have no jet fighters, but rely on NATO allies to protect their airspace against Russia. Can Taiwan count on America? There is no equivalent of NATO in Asia.
倘若友能射中球後面，那然容易玩式防守(密的意大利式“”防守)。波的海家有射式，不依靠北大西洋公(NATO：North Atlantic Treaty Organization，北)盟邦，保他的空，免受俄斯的攻。台能指望美？在洲，有相於北的。
America promises to help Taiwan with the means to defend itself but leaves unsaid whether it would go to war with China over the island. America hints at a greater readiness to fight, and risk nuclear escalation, for Taiwan than for Ukraine. Yet this falls well short of the “sacred obligation” to defend every inch of nato, as President Joe Biden puts it.
美允，以提供自行防、持不表明是否因台，中的方式，助台。美暗示，台於比克更充分作的，及冒著核升的。然而，如同Joe Biden所述，防北每寸土地的“神”相去甚。
Such “strategic ambiguity” is meant to prevent both an attack by China and a declaration of independence by Taiwan. But as the balance of power shifts, the danger is that such uncertainty may fail to deter the former, and dishearten the latter.
“略模糊”是了，防止中及台宣布立。不，著兵力平衡的。危在於，不定性可能法阻止前者，而使後者感到沮。
In contrast with the mutual-defence commitment of NATO’s 30 allies, America’s alliances in Asia are more akin to a hub with spokes. America’s alliances in Asia are more akin to a hub with spokes. America has separate agreements with Australia, Japan, South Korea and others—but they have no obligations to each other. That said, many of them have voiced their interest in preserving the status quo across the Taiwan strait.
北30盟邦的共同防承相下，美在洲的盟邦，更像是具有的。美澳大利、日本、及其他家，有各的。不，它彼此之有。管如此，其中多已表明，有趣持跨台海的。
Ad hoc partnerships are forming for limited purposes. The “Quad”—a loose group of America, India, Japan and Australia—discusses everything from maritime security to economic co-operation and covid.
就的夥伴正了，有限的目的形成中。由美、印度、日本及澳大利成之“四盟”的散集了，海上安全到合作及冠病毒症(Covid：Coronavirus Disease)的所有。
Under the AUKUS partnership, America works with Australia and Britain to develop nuclear-powered submarines for Australia; this is being extended to domains such as hypersonic missiles. Some hope these networks will mesh into a whole strong enough to contain China, but mounting a coherent joint response will be difficult.
在AUKUS(由澳洲、英及美，於2021年9月15日，合宣布成立的事安全合作夥伴)的夥伴下，美澳大利及英合作，澳大利核力艇。正在展到，如高超音速等域。有些人希望，此些能融合成一，大足於遏制中的整。不，很一致的合反。
Japan’s role is important, given its powerful navy, its proximity and the American forces on Okinawa and elsewhere on its territory. On clear days, Taiwan is in sight of Yonaguni, Japan’s westernmost territory. The two countries are among each others’ top trading partners, though they have no formal ties.
於日本大的海、近地及其土上其他地方的美，其角色很重要。在晴朗的日子，台能看到日本最西端的土─那。然家有正式，不它是彼此最大的易夥伴之一。
The shipping lanes around Taiwan are essential for Japan’s trade, in particular energy and food imports. People-to-people ties are strong, too. Taiwan is far less resentful of its time as a Japanese colony than other countries once ruled by Japan are.
台四周的航道日本的易至重要，特是能源及食口。人人之的也很牢固。曾被日本治的其他家相下，台其作日本殖民地期的怨恨要少得多。
For all Japan’s pacifist leanings, there is a growing realisation that it is bound to be involved in any war over Taiwan. To help Taiwan, America would rely on its bases in Japan. China may attack them, either pre-emptively or in response to intervention. It could try to seize the disputed Senkaku islands near Taiwan, which Japan controls, or otherwise violate Japanese territorial waters or airspace.
管日本有和平主向，不有一，它必然入任何攸台之，日益增的知。了助台，美仰其在日本的多基地。 中可能先制人，或干作出攻它的反。因此，可能取日本控制之台附近有的尖，或以其他方式侵犯日本海或空。
The capture of Taiwan would usher in Chinese dominance in Asia, which Japan has historically resisted. Abe Shinzo, a former Japanese prime minister, summed it up last December: “A Taiwan contingency is a Japanese contingency, and therefore a contingency for the Japan- us alliance. Beijing, President Xi Jinping in particular, should not have any misunderstanding in recognising this.”
台宣告，日本一直抗拒之中在洲主地位的到。日本前首相安倍三(Abe Shinzo)，去年12月：「台的意外事件是日本的意外事件，因此也是日美同盟的意外事件。中北京，特是近平主席，在知一上，不有任何解。」
Grey-zone scenarios put Japan in a trickier position. Following changes to the interpretation of the constitution in 2015, Japan’s self-defence forces (SDF) can be deployed for combat even if Japan is not attacked, so long as the situation is deemed to be of “existential” importance.
灰色地的本，使日本於更棘手的境。在2015年，修改法的解之後，即使日本有遭到攻，只要情被具有“存在的”重要性。日本自(SDF)可以行部署。
Yet that is a fundamentally political assessment. The public might balk; so too might Komeito, the pacifist coalition partner of the dominant Liberal Democratic Party. Japanese war games often end with participants tying themselves up in legal knots.
不，那全然是政治估。公豫；占主地位之自民的和平盟夥伴，公明(日本一中偏右的政)也如此。日本的，常以者，自己在法律上而告。
Precisely how Japan might help is unclear, not least because American and Japanese forces lack a NATO-style integrated military command. Neither has much experience of operating with Taiwan.
究竟日本能如何助不。特是，因美及日本，缺乏一北式的整性事指。者皆太多台合作的。
Broadly speaking, the Japanese would focus on defending Japanese territory, including American bases; securing strategic choke-points around Japan; and providing rear-area logistical support, such as supplying fuel and ammunition and treating wounded soldiers. “Without Japan, the us cannot mobilise and surge,” says Koda Yoji, a former commander of Japan’s naval forces.
概略言之，日本人著重於保日本土，包括美基地、保日本周的略要塞及提供後方的後勤支援，如供燃料、及治受士兵。日本前海司令官，Koda Yoji宣：「有日本，美就法行及增兵。」
In Washington, meanwhile, calls are growing for America to do more to defend Taiwan. Repubicans, in particular, urge the Biden administration to provide better weapons and military aid, abandon strategic ambiguity and even station American troops on the island. But for the foreseeable future Taiwan is likely to remain in the twilight zone: a country whose status is undefined and whose vital partnership with America is unclear.
在此同，於美首府盛特，要求美取更多措施，保台的呼日益高。特是共和，敦促拜登政府提供更佳武器及事援助、摒略模糊，甚至在上。不，就可的未而言，台很可能仍於暮光：一地位未定，美之重要夥伴也不的家。
The invasion of Ukraine shows that war can clear away ambiguities and hesitations. Taiwan’s best hope of survival is to deny China a quick victory. It will probably have to fight alone for a time. The longer it can hold out, the likelier it is to win sympathy, admiration and military support. Even now, time may well be Taiwan’s most important military asset.
入侵克示，能清除模棱可及豫不。台最佳的生存希望，是不中速速。因，可能必需一段。能持抵抗愈久，越有可能得同情、佩及事支援。即使目前，也可能是台最重要的事。
“Every day, when Xi Jinping draws back the curtain, he should see the capability that Taiwan, America and the other allies have deployed and tell himself: ‘Today is not the day for an invasion,’” muses Mr Davidson. “We had to run a deterrence strategy for 40 years during the cold war. That may be what winning looks like.” The struggles of the Russian wolf show how the Chinese bei might be kept at bay.
Davidson先生宣：「每天，近平拉帷幕，他看到台、美及其他盟邦已部署的能力，而告自己：今天不是侵犯的日子。在冷期，我不得不行一威略，40年。那或是看似的子。」俄斯狼的此些示了，中如何被困於境中。
址：https://www.economist.com/briefing/what-taiwan-can-learn-from-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/21808850?utm_cOntent=ed-picks-article-link-3&etear=nl_weekly_3&utm_campaign=a.the-economist-this-week&utm_medium=email.internal-newsletter.np&utm_source=salesforce-marketing-cloud&utm_term=4/21/2022&utm_id=1140377
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